There is an extensive literature on the spatial effects of the restrictions on movements imposed on Palestinians of the Occupied Territories. Yet few studies have analyzed the Israeli permit regime despite its central role in the implementation of those restrictions. So far, most attempts to tackle this issue have been conducted by researchers and NGOs involved in the judicial support of Palestinians applying for permits (Berda 2012; Bocco 2015; Lein 2005; Etkes 2011; Gisha 2011; Cahana and Kanonich 2013; Kadman 2012; Piterman 2007; Palestinian Monitoring Group 2005) . This lack of academic literature seems to be linked to the absence of written rules and the opacity of the system.
Most works apprehend the effects of the permit regime together with other Israeli mechanisms of control. It is often treated it as a mere extension of the Israeli system of identification (Kelly 2006; Abu Zahra 2007; Abu Zahra and Kay 2013; Tawil Souri 2011 and seen as participating into the operation of the general regime of mobility (Shamir 2005) or the matrix of control (Halper 2000) that restricts the access of Palestinians to certain zones and means of transportation. The territorial configurations created by these mechanisms of control have been conceptualized through different metaphors: "inclusive-exclusion" (Ophir, Givoni and Hanafi 2009) , "politics of verticality" (Weizman 2002) , or "hyper-connected archipelago" versus "fragmented enclaves" (Petti 2007) . Research on the use of Palestinian and Israeli space (Bishara 2006; Bontemps and Signoles 2012; Handel 2009a; Makdisi 2010; Taraki 2006) has shown the way movement restrictions have deepened the space and time asymmetry between populations (Collins 2008; Handel 2009a Handel , 2015 Peteet 2009; Parizot 2009) and reinforced a colonial regime based on a hierarchy of citizenship according to ethno-national belonging (Abu Zahra 2007; Yiftachel 2009; Yacobi 2016; Zureik et al. 2010) .
In this article, I discuss the spatialities of the Israeli restrictions of movement with two shifts of perspective. First, I focus solely on the Israeli permit regime in order to scrutinize more precisely the chains of formal and informal mediation that this mechanism of control sets up between Palestinian applicants and Israeli administrations. I contend that by studying the dynamic of these power relations, I will better examine the specific ways through which this system contributes to articulate Israeli and Palestinian spaces and to regulate Palestinian space practices. In that perspective, my research follows that of Yael Berda (2012) who studied the spatiality of the permit regime through its complex organizational scheme as well as through the ramification of the informal economy it fosters between Israeli employers and the Israeli administrations. But I complement her analysis by taking into consideration the part played by additional actors: at the institutional level, the role of foreign agencies (International Committee of the Red Cross, Foreign consulates, etc.) and, at the informal level, the chains of mediation between Palestinian applicants and the Israeli administration. By studying the role of these individuals and institutions in the operation of this system, I do not merely wish to insist on the fact that the Israeli colonial mechanisms rely largely also on Palestinian and foreign state and non-state actors 2 , but also to stress their role in its transformations and its historicity. 3 Second, and more significantly, narrowing the scope of the inquiry helps apprehend the spatial effects of the permit regime beyond national and territorial frames. I do not question the fact that, in Israel Palestine, relations of power and domination flow along national lines, and that the permit regime has allowed the progressive ghettoization of Palestinians; but I contend that being content with such conclusion prevents us from understanding much deeper effects of the Israeli mechanisms of control. Drawing on Henri Lefebvre's (2000) concept of production of space, I apprehend spaces not only through the shapes of territory but also through the dynamics and articulations of people's streams of actions. This shift allows me to reappraise the power of this regime through the disjunction it creates between the viscous textures of Palestinian spatial practices compared to fluid Israeli ones.
NATION, TERRITORY AND SPACE
National and territorial frames of thinking fail to take into consideration the fact that Israeli mechanisms of control need to maintain complex interactions between Israeli and Palestinians spaces.
By considering national belonging as a dominant or exclusive principle of organization, national frames divert the attention from other kinds of links such as economic partnership, kinship and certain political affiliation. Thus they tend to raise national categories to the level of analytical concepts. Furthermore, by conceiving space through the metaphor of territory 4 , they often assume a correspondence between, nation, territory and society (Agnew 1994) , and that neighboring societies are discretely separated realms (Gupta and Ferguson 1992) .
Such a framework posits from the outset a clear-cut separation between Israeli and Palestinian societies as well as between their spaces of life. This separation is all the more taken for granted 2 On this issue see Latte Abdallah and Parizot 2015 3 On this issue see Gordon 2008 , Berda 2012 , Yacobi 2016 , Allegra et al. 2017 The territory is a specific and situated representation that was elaborated in Western Europe between the 16 th and the 20 th century in the context of the emergence of the nation-state (Lefebvre 2000) .
since spaces and groups are often constructed as unquestionable objects. Embedded in a Cartesian logic, space is conceived as an object standing outside of a "thinking and watching" subject. It is regarded as a container in which one can outline and classify discrete forms according to their functionalities (social, economic, national spaces, ethno-classes, kinship groups, etc.) (Lefebvre 2000) . These sub-spaces or elements are so reified that they are apprehended as irreducible realities.
Besides, while many works have attempted to assess the complex articulations of these spaces (inclusion/exclusion, superposition/juxtaposition, continuity/discontinuity, etc.), they have systematically overlooked the way they overlap or penetrate one another. In a certain way, the territorial approach comforts the taken-for-granted "objectivity" of separation between Israeli and Palestinian spaces; or to put it in a different way, it naturalizes the objects it produces (Brenner and Elden 2009 ).
The persisting compartmentalization of the research between Israeli and Palestinian fields of study is both an illustration and a factor of such a tendency, since it contributes to hierarchize research objects (Latte Abdallah and Parizot 2015) . Processes taking place within the limit of Israeli and
Palestinian ascribed spaces are legitimate while those developing "in between" are seen as "peripheral" and without significant consequences.
Yet, recent research has revealed the significance of such persisting links and interactions between Israelis and Palestinians in the functioning of these societies and of the occupation regime. The Israeli separation policy did not put an end to such relations; it transformed their form, content and intensity (Latte Abdallah and Parizot 2015) . These ongoing relations have reorganized power relations and solidarities between Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza and from Israel and affected their feeling of shared identities (Bornstein 2002; Parizot 2006; Marteu 2015) . They have also constructed alternative political practices and imaginaries contesting hegemonic representations of spaces among Israeli and Palestinian activists (Pouzol 2015; Lamarche 2015; Swirsky 2012 ).
Yet, my aim here is less to focus on the contestation developed by these practices and imaginaries than to try to understand how these interactions and mediations contribute to intensify and disseminate the power relations maintained by the permit regime beyond ethno-national hierarchies. Moreover, by departing from national and territorial frameworks, I will also be able to assess the impact of this mobility regime beyond the sole physical movements. Most research on the Israeli mechanisms of control have reduced space to geography and, hence, spatial practice to the physical movement of a person on a surface from a point A to B (Handel 2015) . By taking into consideration the many power interactions in which a person needs to engage in order to mobilize the necessary resources she/he needs to obtain a permit and physically move, this article aims to pursue the analysis of earlier works that have showed how Israeli power "mechanisms have become deeply entrenched in individual, family and community structure" (Hammoudeh et al. 2016) .
In order to provide a full picture of the spatial effects and dimension of the permit regime I suggest to rely on the critical approach outlined by Henri Lefebvre (2000) who conceives space as a production resulting from the articulation of streams of actions of competing and unequal actors.
Space is no longer conceived as an object or a container, exterior to the subject, but as a complex dynamic of flows, a co-production in which even the most powerless actors, as well as academics, have their share.
This production can be understood through the articulation of three different dynamics: conceived spaces, perceived spaces, and lived spaces. Conceived spaces (espaces conçus) relate to hegemonic representations of planners, technocrats, state authorities and academics that hold sufficient power and means to impose them to others (Lefebvre 2000) . They are materialized and conveyed by architecture, institutions and rules. They partially escape the people who enunciate and promote them because they are embedded in discourses and regime of visibility that are themselves structured in much broader frameworks. While hegemonic, they are continuously contested. Israeli ethnic and colonial categories fit into these hegemonic conceptions of spaces.
The second dynamics through which the production of space can be studied is that of perceived spaces (espaces perçus) or what Lefebvre also calls spatial practice (pratique spatiale). Perceived spaces are related to conceived spaces, although distinct from them. This complex relation is due to the fact that they mutually influence each other while also being structured by their broader logics.
Spatial practice is constituted by the assemblage (agencement) of the streams of actions of unequal actors. Drawing from the actor network theory of Akrich, Callon and Latour (2006) , I regard these streams as circulating through, and structuring socio-technical networks involving humans and nonhuman mediators (movement permits, roads, phone networks, etc.). They contribute to the emergence of infrastructures that organize mobility and mediate the relations between people in order to construct their own relation to space. These processes of appropriation and the combination they engender contribute, at their scale, to readjust both spatial practices and conceived spaces.
In the following pages, I insist on the disjunction and the articulation of these spatial dynamics. I will first highlight the discrepancies between, on the one hand, the ways the Israeli permit regime has rebordered the Israeli and Palestinian territories (conceived space) and, on the other hand, the diffuse networks of connections (spatial practice) it has created between Israeli, Palestinian and foreign actors. Finally, by drawing on an ethnographic analysis of the formal and informal chains of mediation generated by permit procedure, I will examine the trajectories (lived spaces) of Palestinian applicants and Israeli sponsors. I will show that while facilitating the allocation of movement permits, mediators also introduce mechanisms of regulation and domination that affect the functioning of the whole system and thus the broad spatial practice.
REBORDERING ISRAELI PALESTINIAN SPACES
At the beginning of the 1990s, the emergence of the permit regime of access and movement did not 10 During the 1990s, in the frame of the negotiations and the Israeli withdrawals, the West Bank was divided into three types of zone named A, B and C. In the A zones, Israel delegated security and civil control to the Palestinian Authority; in the B zones, the Palestinian Authority was responsible for public order and the internal security of the Palestinians while Israel reserved the right to act on any questions of external security. Lastly, the C zones remained under Israeli control. 11 The Green Line corresponds to the armistice line that was fixed between Israel and it belligerents in 1949.
Finally, the permit regime has introduced a great deal of uncertainty in Palestinians movements (Kelly 2006) . The army has extensively relied on the changes of locations of flying checkpoints and obstacles as well as on the arbitrariness of closures in order to make it difficult for Palestinians to plan a journey (Handel 2009a) . Likewise, the Civil Administration has avoided make public the criteria and procedures by which an applicant can obtain a permit of access and movement. The declared aim of such policy was to prevent "terrorists" from being able to plan a journey and being able to carry out an attack against Israeli targets (Ben-Ari et al. 2005; Berda 2012 ). Consequently, the permit regime does not solely limit the range of Palestinians' movement within Israeli and Palestinian territories, it also imposes another relation to space and time on them (Kelly 2006; Handel 2009; Peteet 2008; Parizot 2009 ).
Yet, as I mentioned earlier, these works have mostly understood space through a territorial approach. I wish now to pursue the discussion on the effects of the permit regime on spatial practice (Lefebvre 2000) , i.e. on the way it re-articulates the streams of actions of the actors involved in its operation.
FROM TERRITORY TO SPATIAL PRACTICE
From an institutional and an individual perspective, this regime relies on formal and informal socio- (2005) reported that the delays, costs, procedures related to the delivery of a magnetic card -which is a precondition to apply for a permit-were distinct within each West Bank district. On the changes of the procedures for obtaining a magnetic card, see also Piterman (2007: 11-12) .
Palestinian wishing to obtain a work permit has to contact an Israeli employer that will turn to the relevant governmental agency. In the building sector, an employer will have to register to the Payment Division (Matash) of the Israeli Ministry of Economy that will determine whether he is eligible to recruit Palestinian workers. This process involves inquiries and can often take weeks or even months (Berda 2012; Kadman 2012 ). Once he is defined as eligible, the employer transmits the personal details (ID number, name, address) of his employee. His request is sent to the Employment Staff Officer at the Israeli Civil Administration. If the person fits the security criteria and is not blacklisted by the Shabak, he/she is sent a work permit for a period of six months Chains of mediation seem often more decisive in determining the chance of obtaining a permit than the characteristics and status of an applicant (age, marital situation, place of residency, number of children, etc.). This is due to the fact that sponsors' activities also determine the procedures that a
Palestinian applicant has to follow. Regulations not only show gaps between a given period or place and another, but they also reveal differences according to the economic sector of activity: a permit application in the building sector is not the same as in agriculture (Kadman 2012) . Moreover, the criteria of eligibility for a work permit, such as the minimum age required, can also vary according to the activity within the same economic sector. For instance, "in 2011, Palestinians 28 or older were permitted to work in citrus and strawberry picking, whereas tending to citrus groves was permitted only for people who were 35 or older (Kadman 2012: 12) ." In addition to this, the security profile, which is the main criterion of eligibility for a permit, is defined through processes of ascription that escape the applicant's will or knowledge. In fact, it is elaborated on the basis of the connections, or potential connections, that the Shabak establishes between the applicant and political organizations, people or activities that have been classified as representing a security risk (Latte Abdallah 2015; Berda 2012; Piterman 2012) . This profiling also takes into consideration links to events or circumstances that might affect one's attitude or behavior. This is why a person whose family member has been killed or hurt by the Israeli army is often excluded for security reasons. This process of ascription is based on the more or less reliable information of the General Security Services and on acts of denunciation by a Palestinian neighbor or an Israeli employer with whom the applicant is in conflict. As a matter of fact, many (Berda 2012; Diamond 2007 ) report that people who are denied a permit on a security basis often suspect that they are victims of a denunciation by someone who wishes to harm them. 
A DYNAMIC TOPOLOGY
The regulating effects of these networks is all the more complex to grasp as their topology 19 Their judicial mediation was all the more needed by Palestinians because of the opacity that the Israeli authorities had maintained over the procedures of permit delivery, because the tightening of the closure policy had made permits more difficult to obtain, and finally because more and more Palestinians had been blacklisted by the police and the Shabak.
In the absence of explicit and published regulations, NGOs, individual lawyers and certain agencies linked to the PA have attempted, with more or less success, to decipher, through the regularity of Some Israeli and Palestinian entrepreneurs have set up very profitable activities around the informal trafficking of permits. For practical reasons, Israeli employers often apply for more permits than they actually need. They do this in order to counter the potential refusal of the Israeli authorities to issue permits to some workers, because the latter might be blacklisted or because of procedural defects.
The underlying logic is that it is better to ask for more than to have an insufficient number of workers on site. The employer can always use the additional ones to help former or future employees.
In case of a surplus of permits, the recipient will refund to the employer the monthly fees that must be paid to the Payment Division for taxes and social benefits. In 2010, these amounted to 1200NIS
(about 240EUR). Such a document provided the beneficiary with the possibility of crossing checkpoints "legally" and traveling inside Israel more or less freely. Yet it also implied finding a job by themselves… "illegally".
Some employers have seized this opportunity in order to develop additional profits. Instead of applying for the 100 permits he needs, an entrepreneur can apply for 200 for a period of 6 months to (Kadman 2012: 20) .
The development of these different brokerage activities has organized parallel channels of permit allocation. In the southern West Bank, people explained to me that there were four kinds of permits: a regular one delivered through the regular procedure; a regular permit obtained through a real sponsorship but a fake job application; a permit accessed through a Palestinian collaborating with the Shabak; and a fake permit produced by a local falsifier.
The wealth and the power generated through these networks of mediation push the people who master them to regulate the entry of outsiders strictly. As a matter of fact, not everybody can access these networks of facilitators or of permit traffickers. The rules and limitations which make them hard to access for newcomers contribute to the building of new obstacles to the movement of Palestinians and to some extent to the capacity of Israeli employers to recruit workers. In all, they limit the extension of mediation networks and reduce the fluidity of interactions and information they channel. In that respect, the Israeli permit regime shows some similarities to the bordering technologies of global and postcolonial capitalism described, among others, by Makaremi (2008) , Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) . These technologies do not aim to confine unwanted people territorially or to dissociate their movements from those of citizens, but to inscribe them into temporalities and spatialities that are disjointed to the point of giving these populations the illusion of being territorially separated. Here, the containment of Israelis and Palestinians into disjointed spatialities reinforces the illusion of their (territorial) separation while they remain practically linked through networks of individual relations and infrastructures.
CONCLUSION
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